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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOFFAT COUNTY STATE ) 
BANK, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
R. J. PINDER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9166 
BRIEF O·F AP·PELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 12, 1956, R. J. Pinder issued his check 
number 442 in the amount of $2,500.00 payable to 
Bill Arnn. 
On all dates relative to this action Bill Arnn, some-
times known as E. S. Arnn, had an account in The Mof-
fat County State Bank. At the time Bill Arnn opened 
his account in The Moffat County State Bank he executed 
a depositor's agreement which contained the following 
provision: 
1 
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''Items received for deposit or collection are 
accepted on the following terms and conditions. 
This bank acts only as depositor's collection agent 
... items are credited subject to final payment and 
to receipt of proceeds of final payment in cash ... 
by this bank at its office ... " (R-10) 
On October 15, 1956, at Craig, Colorado, Bill Arnn 
endorsed the above referred to check for deposit to his 
checking account and coincidentally therewith executed 
a deposit agreement which deposit agreement contains 
the following statement: 
''Items received for deposit or collection are 
accepted on the following terms and conditions. 
This bank acts only as depositor's collecting agent 
and assumes no responsibility beyond its exercise 
of due care. All items are credited subject to final 
payment and to receipt of proceeds of final pay-
ment in cash or solvent credits by this bank at its 
own office. This bank may forward items to cor-
respondents and shall not be liable for default or 
negligence of correspondents selected with due 
care nor for losses in transit, and each correspond-
ent shall not be liable except for its own negligence. 
Items and their proceeds may be handled by any 
Federal Reserve Bank in accordance with applic-
able Federal Reserve rules and by this bank or any 
correspondent in accordance with any common 
bank usage, with any practice or procedure that a 
Federal Reserve Bank may use or permit another 
bank to use or with any other lawful means. This 
bank may charge back at any time any item drawn 
on this bank which is ascertained to be drawn 
against insufficient funds or otherwise not good or 
payable. An item received after this bank's regu-
lar afternoon closing hour shall be deemed received 
the next business day. (R-9 Lines through 17 
and R-11) 
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The Moffat County State Bank gave Bill Arnn credit 
in his checking account for the face amount of the 
check. (R-8) 
The check was presented to the drawee Bank (Sandy 
City Bank), on October 20, 1956, and was dishonored. 
(R-8) 
The Moffat County State Bank received notice of 
dishonor on October 22, 1956, and cancelled its endorse-
ment on the check on October 24, 1956. (R-8) 
The Moffat County State Bank received notice of dis-
honor on October 22, 1956, and cancelled its endorsement 
on the check on October 24, 1956. (R-8) 
The Moffat County State Bank on and between the 
date of receipt of deposit and notice of dishonor paid the 
following checks against the credit resulting from the 
deposit of the check referred to. (R-10) 
Oct. 15 $217.27less credit $27.10 ______ $190.17 
Oct. 16---------------------------------------------------- 50.00 
Oct. 16·--------------------------------------------------- 50.00 
Oct. 16---------------------------------------------------- 272.56 
Oct. 18·--------------------------------------------------- 50.00 
Oct. 19·--------------------------------------------------- 200.00 
Oct. 19·--------------------------------------------------- 27 4.86 
Oct. 19 ----------------------------------·----------------- 285.14 
Oct. 19---------------------------------------------------- 376.16 
Oct. 20---------------------------------------------------- 267.14 
Oct. 20---------------------------------------------------- 200.00 
Total Checks----------·-----------$2,216. 03 
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The· consideration for. the check above referred to 
f~iled and R. J. Pinder notified Sandy City Bank to refuse 
payment when the check was presented and said bank 
did refuse payment. (R-8) 
The Moffat County State Bank did not have knowl-
edge of the failure of consideration until such time as it 
was advised that the check had been dishonored and 
said bank now holds said check and the same has not been 
paid. (R-9) 
The Moffat County State Bank is incorporated under 
the laws of the State of Colorado with its principal place 
of business in Craig, Colorado, and R. J. Pinder is a 
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R-8) 
The instrument has not been protested by plaintiff. 
(R-8, 9, and 15) 
(For emphasis, the Appellant has italicized portions 
of documents and authorities in its brief.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Court erred in granting the plaintiff's and re-
spondent's motion for summary judgment, in that: 
I. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A HOLDER IN DUE 
COURSE AND THEREFORE F AlLURE OF CONSID-
ERATION IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO THE 
ACTION. 
II. THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH MUST 
BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
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III. THE CHECK WAS NOT PROTESTED AS 
REQUIRED BY TITLE 44, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 27, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND THERE-
FORE THE DRAWER IS DISCHARGED. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
I. THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT A ROLDER IN DUE 
COURSE AND THEREFORE F AlLURE OF CONSID-
ERATION IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO THE 
ACTION. 
If the plaintiff is not a holder in due course then, 
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, Title 44, 
Chapter 1, Section 59, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the 
plaintiff is barred from recovery for it is stipulated that 
the consideration for the instrument failed. 
"44-1-59. WHEN SuBJECT TO ORIGINAL DE-
FENsEs. - In the hands of any holder other than a 
holder in due course a negotiable instrument is 
subject to the same defenses as if it were non-
negotiable ... '' 
It is therefore obvious that the plaintiff must estab-
lish that he was a holder in due course. A holder in due 
course is defined by Title 44, Chapter 1, Section 53, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as follows: 
"44-1-53. WHAT CoNSTITUTES A HoLDER IN 
DUE CouRsE. - A holder in due course is a holder 
who has taken the instrument under the following 
conditions : 
'' (1) That it is complete and regular upon-its 
face. 
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"(2) That he became the holder of it before 
it was overdue and without notice that it 
had been previously dishonored, if such 
was the fact. 
'' ( 3) That he took it in good faith and for 
value. 
" ( 4) That at the time it was negotiated to 
him he had no notice of any infirmity in 
the instrument or defect in the title of 
the person negotiating it.'' 
The critical portions of the above statute are the por-
tions that require the holder to take the instrument "in 
good faith and for value'' by ''negotiation.'' It is appel-
lant's contention in this case that the plaintiff was not 
a holder in due course and not entitled to the privileges 
and protections thereof because the plaintiff took the 
instrument as agent of the payee and therefore all de-
fenses available against the principal are also available 
against the agent. 
The relationship between the payee of the check and 
the plaintiff bank is controlled by written agreements 
which agreements, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, 
constitute the bank an agent of the payee for the purpose 
of collecting the instrument. These agreements are pre-
pared by the Moffat County State Bank and therefore 
must be construed most strictly against said bank. The 
wording of the agreements is clear and concise and defines 
the bank as agent only. 
The law of the State of Utah is clearly set forth in 
the case of Western Creamery Co. v. Malia et al., 89 Utah 
422, 57 P. (2d) 734, wherein the Court determined that 
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the bank would be found by its deposit agreement. The 
Court's decision in the case of Western Creamery Co. v. 
Malia et al., supra, stated as follows: 
'' * * * . . . When the deposit slip contains 
a provision to the effect that the bank in which the 
check is deposited acts merely as the agent for 
collection, and not as purchaser thereof, such fact 
is uniformly regarded as very material, if not con-
clusive, evidence of the intention of the parties as 
to the passing of title. 11 A.L.R. 1070 ; 42 A.L.R. 
502; 68 A. L. R. 735. In the instant case the check 
was received by the defendant bank which was 
authorized to forward it for collection or payment, 
and to receive payment in a draft drawn by the 
drawee or other bank, and, except for negligence, 
the defendant bank was not liable for the dishonor 
of the draft so received in payment, nor for losses 
thereon. The foregoing provision clearly indicates 
that the defendant bank regarded itself, not as the 
owner of the check, but as the mere agent for the 
collection of the money notwithstanding plaintiff 
was given credit therefor. Plaintiff did not draw 
against the check nor receive any payment 
thereon. There was no agreement to the effect that 
plaintiff had any such a right. The mere fact that 
on one occasion plaintiff did draw against a check 
deposited to its account at the defendant bank be-
fore the check had been collected from the drawee 
bank does not require a finding that plaintiff on 
the occasion in question had such a right. The find-
ing of the court below to the effect that· the title to 
the check in question did not pass to the defendant 
bank when it was there deposited should not be 
disturbed. '' 
The doctrine in Utah is in conformity with the gen-
eral rule of law as applied in the United States and as 
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f:fet forth in 7 American Juris prudence - Banks, which 
states, beginning on page 320 : 
"§449. Effect of Giving Credit; Right to 
Charge Back Dishonored Paper. - ... That the 
title remains in the depositor is especially true if 
the credit is entered upon the agreement that it is 
subject to payment of the paper and that it may 
be charged off in case of the dishonor of the paper. 
( ... 11 A.L.R. 1050, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084, 42 A.L.R. 
495, 68 A.L.R. 729, and 99 A.L.R. 489.) ... The 
bank may, as a matter of favor and convenience, 
permit checks to be drawn against such paper be-
fore. payment, since the depositor, in the event of 
nonpayment, is responsible for the sums drawn, 
not by reason of his indorsement, the paper not 
having ceased to be his property, but for money 
paid.'' 
In this case the intention of the parties is determined 
not just by a routine execution of a deposit slip but is 
actually controlled by the deposit agreement. It is neces-
sary to determine the intention of the parties at the time 
of the negotiation or transfer of the instrument from the 
payee to the Moffat County State Bank. This rule is set 
forth in 7 American Jurisprudence - Banks § 447 as 
follows: 
"D. Deposits of Commercial Paper; Title 
Thereto; Right to Charge Back Credit Given 
''§449. Generally.-
''The determination of the question of title to 
commercial paper transferred to a bank which 
credits it to the depositor's account fundamentally 
involves a question of intention. (. . . 11 A.L.R. 
8 
'' I 
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1043, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084, 42 A.L.R. 492, 68 A.L.R. 
725, and 99 A.L.R. 486, 487 ; . · .. ) Where there. is 
direct evidence of such intention, as where the con-
tract expressly provides as to the passing of title, 
the question is relatively simple .... Such intention 
must, however, be determined as of the date when 
the deposit is made, and not in the light of subse-
quent events. (11 A.L.R. 1046, s. 16 A.L.R. 1084, 
42 A.L.R. 494, 68 A.L.R. 727, and 99 A.L.R. 488; 
7 L.R.A. 852 ; . . . ) " 
The intention of the parties at the time of the trans-
fer of the instrument from the payee to his bank must 
be determined by the written instruments admitted to 
evidence under stipulation since no contrary evidence of 
intention has been submitted to the Court. 
Under the specific written agreements admitted to 
evidence in this case and in view of the fact that there is 
no evidence of any contrary intention, whether oral or 
written, The Moffat County State Bank's relationship 
to the payee of the check is conclusively proven to be 
that of agent and under the prevailing law of the United 
States and the State of Utah said bank does not qualify 
as a holder in due course. 
PoiNT II. 
II. THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH MUST 
BE APPLIED IN DETERMINING THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
The plaintiff cites in defense of his position the Colo-
rado case of Broomfield v. Cochran et al., 283 P. 45, but 
the law of the State of Colorado is not applicable to the 
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case at hand. In the present case the decisions relative 
to the determination of this question of conflicts of law 
have been summarized in 27 Yale Law Journal, Pages 
804 through 807 as follows: 
''The question of what law defines the de-
fenses available against the good faith holder has 
most frequently arisen where the defenses have 
been asserted by the primary parties .... The 
law of the place of endorsement when it differs 
from that of both the place of execution and pay-
ment will not be held applicable. Nor does the 
law of the place of exceution of the instrument 
govern when the place of execution differs from 
the place of payment and indorsement. But where 
it is possible to isolate the place of payment from 
both the place of execution and indorsement the 
courts almost uniformly hold the law of the place 
of payment to govern .... The weight of authority 
seems to apply the same rule {to determine wheth-
er a holder is a holder in due course) as in the 
case of defenses.'' 
The check was executed, delivered, and made pay-
able in the State of Utah. It was drawn on a Utah bank 
by a Utah resident and the action has been brought in a 
Utah Court. The question as to whether the plaintiff is 
a holder in due course, and entitled to maintain an action 
against defendant as drawer of the check must be deter-
mined by the laws of the State of Utah. 
"10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes § 47 (a) (1) at 
page 486. - All rna tters bearing on the execution, 
the interpretation, and validity, including the ca-
pacity of the parties to contract, are to be deter-
mined by the law of the place where the contract 
is made. ( 2) All rna tters connected with the pay-
ment, including presentation, notice, demand, pro-
10 
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test, and other damages for non-payment, are to be 
regulated by the law of the place where the instru-
ment is to be paid. All matters respecting the rem-
edy to be pursued, including the bringing of suits, 
service of process, and admissibility of evidence, 
depend on the law of the place where the action is 
brought.'' 
Under all of these categories, the law of Utah would 
be applicable. While it is true that the indorsement by 
Mr. Arnn to the plaintiff bank constituted a separate con-
tract it must be remembered that this is not an action by 
the receiving bank against the indorser but is one be-
tween the indorsee and the drawer, and the liability of 
the drawer is to be determined by the law of the place 
where the check is drawn and payable. 
"10 C. J. S. Bills an.d Notes§ 61(b) at page 
495. As the drawer of a bill of exchange does not 
contract to pay the money in the foreign place on 
which it is drawn, but only guarantees its accept-
ance and payment in that place by the drawee, 
his contract is regarded as made at the place 
where the bill is drawn, and as to its form and na-
ture and the obligation and effect thereof is gov-
erned by the law of that place with regard to the 
payee and any subsequent holder. This law gov-
erns the drawer's liability to an indorsee, deter-
mines his right to set up defenses against the 
indorsee ... and determines the measure of his lia-
bility for interest and and damages.'' To the 
same effect see 11 American Jurisprudence, Con-
flict of Laws§ 151. 
''Ogden, Negotiable Instruments (5th Ed. 
1947) § 256 at page 482 ... If a negotiable note is 
made in one state and payable there, and it is 
afterwards indorsed in another state, and by the 
11 
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law of the former state, equitable defenses are let 
in, in favor of the maker, and by the laws of the 
latter state excluded, the rule governing as to the 
holder is the law of the place where the note. was 
made. There the maker undertook to pay and the 
· ··subsequent negotiation did not change his obliga-
tion or right. The contract of the drawer of a bill 
of exchange. is governed by the law of the place 
where the bill is drawn in regard to the rights of 
the payee and any subsequent holder ... '' 
''Ibid ~ 258 at pages 484 and 485. The lia-
bility of the indorser is said to be governed by the 
law of the place where the indorsement is made. 
... It is the new liability created by the indorse-
ment in favor of the indorsee and subsequent 
indorsers that causes this law to govern. This 
law governs only as to the new liability created be-
tween the indorsee or subsequeut indorsers and the 
prior indorsers. The right of the transferee or 
indorsee against the original parties to the instru-
ment a.re determined by the law of the place where 
the contract was made or is to be performed . ... " 
"Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3rd Ed. 1905) 
§ 45 1 (c). While, as shown in a previous section, 
the indorsement of a note or bill constitutes a sepa-
rate and distinct contract, which, so far as con-
cerns the liability of the indorser to subsequent 
parties, is governed by the law of the place of 
indorsement, it is established, practically without 
contradiction, that the liability of, and substan-
tive defenses available to, the maker of a ·note or 
acceptor of a bill of exchange are, even as against 
a subsequent indorsee, to be determined by the 
law that originally governed the contract, and 
cannot be increased, diminished, or impaired by 
the subsequent indorsement or transfer. . .. '' 
12 
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In Badger Machinery Co. v. United States Bank and 
Trust Co., 166 Wise. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917) an action 
was brought to, inter alia, enforce unpaid stock subscrip-
tions and test the validity of outstanding bonds. Under 
the law of Wisconsin the appellant was not a bona fide 
holder in due course as the bonds were taken by it as 
collateral security for a pre-existing debt. It was con-
tended that the trial court erred in excluding proof 
that under the New Mexico law, where the bonds were 
transferred to appellant, the appellant was a holder in 
due course. The Supreme Court in denying this con-
tention stated: 
''In the instant case the bonds were Wiscon-
sin contracts payable in Wisconsin; the maker of 
them ... is a Wisconsin corporation; and the appel-
lant the United States Bank and Trust Co., is 
enforcing its claim in a Wisconsin Court. True, 
the contract between Bridge, who sold the bonds to 
appellant, and appellant may be considered as 
made outside of Wisconsin, and if the action here 
were between appellant and Bridge, a different 
question would be presented. The issues involved 
in the case at bar are between the maker of the 
paper involved and the appellant who purchased 
the paper amd claims to be a holder for value in 
due course. 
"The laws of Wisconsin beca.me a part of the 
contract of the maker in the instant case and de-
termine whether the holder is a bon.a fide holder 
for value in due course or not ... 
''While there seems to be some conflict in the 
authorities we are satisfied that the rule laid down 
for the instant case is supported by the weight 
of authority." 
13 
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In Woodruff v. Hill, 116 Mass. 310 at page 311 (1874) 
the plaintiffs, as indorsees of a promissory note made in 
Massachusetts by a Massachusetts resident and payable 
there, brought suit in Massachusetts against the makers. 
The note was indorsed by the payee to the plaintiffs in 
New York. The defendants offered to prove that by the 
law of New York the plaintiffs, upon the evidence, were 
not bona fide holders for value except as to the amount 
of the money paid by them to the payees at the time of 
the indorsement. The Court upheld the exclusion of 
such proof and stated: 
''The note was made in Massachusetts and the 
contract of the makers with the payees and with 
any indorsee was to be performed here, and gov-
erned by our law. Story Conflict of Laws ~~ 317, 
344, 356.'' 
The same result was reached in Webster v. Howe 
Machine Co., 54 Conn. 394, 8 Atlantic 482 (1886) at page 
483 where drafts were drawn in New York by one Stock-
well on defendant company in favor of plaintiffs, who 
were London bankers. The draft was delivered by Stock-
well to plaintiffs who indorsed it and sold it for him, and 
placed the proceeds to his credit in his account ·wi.th them, 
as he was then indebted to them for a larger sum. Under 
the law of New York, one who took a paper upon a pre-
existing debt was not a bona fide holder for value. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court in holding that the law of 
New York governed stated: 
''The defendant had its office and place of 
business in New York; there the acceptance was 
made; there the bill was made payable. In an 
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action at law for an enforcement of a contract, the 
law of the jurisdiction in which it is made and to 
be executed determines the extent of the obligation 
of the contractor, and the character of the defenses 
which he may interpose for his protection.'' 
In Bright v. Judson, 47 Barbour's Rep. 29, at page 
36 (N. Y. 1866) it was held that a bill of exchange pay-
able in New York, although delivered and accepted in the 
State of Indiana, was a contract to be performed in New 
York and was to be governed by the laws of that state as 
to whether one who received a bill for an antecedent debt 
is a bona fide holder for value. 
''The defendant as acceptor of the draft in 
suit, was the principal debtor, and although he 
accepted in the State of Indiana, yet it was a con-
tract to be performed in New York, and is to be 
governed by the laws of that state.'' 
In First Natl. Ba.nk of Chicago v. Dean, 17 N.Y.S. 
375 at page 378 (N.Y. 1892) it was held that the question 
of whether the plaintiff was holder in due course of nego-
tiable warehouse receipts was to be determined by the 
law of New York where the contract was made and to be 
performed and not by the law of Illinois where the notes 
were indorsed to plaintiffs. 
'' . . . It cannot be that if a negotiable o bliga-
tion, made in this state, is there transferred for a 
precedent debt, the transferee is not a bona fide 
holder to shut out equities in favor of the maker; 
and yet if the obligation is transferred in Illinois, 
to a resident of that state, our courts must ignore 
the rule adopted in this state and follow that pre-
vailing in lllinois .... Any such doctrine would be 
an unjust discrimination in favor of non-residents 
15 
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against residents of our own state, .inconsistent 
with every principle of comity or notion of uniform 
justice a.nd cannot prevail. 
· "As against (indorser), its obligation might, 
in a proper action, be determined by the laws of 
Illinois, because its indorsement - which is to an 
extent an independent contract - was made and 
delivered there .... '' 
See also Pratt v. Dittmer, 197 P. 356 (Cal. App., 1921) 
held that promissory notes payable in Iowa are to be 
interpreted under the law of that state as to rights of 
bona fide holder. 
Green v. Kennedy, 6 Mo. App. 577 (Mo. 1879) held 
that the question of a bona fide .holder was to be deter~ 
mined under the laws of the state where the note was 
payable though negotiated in another state. See also 
Tyrell v. Cairo a,nd S. L. R. R. Co., 7 Mo. App. 294 (1879). 
Limerick Natl. Bank v. Howard, 51 Atl. 641 at page 
643 (N.H. 1901) held that the law of Vermont where the 
notes were executed and payable governs question as to 
whether a party is a holder in due course. 
''So, if by the law of the place of contract, 
even although negotiable, equitable defenses are 
allowed in favor of the baker, any subsequent 
indorsement will not change his right in regard 
to the holder. The latter must take it cum 
onere ... " 
United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Sup. 547 (D. C. Md. 
1940). The question of whether the government was 
holder in due course of a note was to be determined by 1· 
the laws of Maryland where the note was executed and I, 
where the contract was made and to be performed. I: 
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"Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss. 119 at page 128 
(1872). As the notes were executed and to be paid 
in Tennessee, they are to be governed by the laws 
of that state, and upon questions connected with 
commercial paper, it is there well settled that the 
suspension or satisfaction of a precedent debt is 
not sufficient consideration to give the assignee or 
indorsee of a bill or note the position of a bona 
:fide purchaser. . . . '' See also Harrison v. Pike 
Bros., 48 Miss. 46 (1873). 
One of the very basic policies of the conflict of laws 
is to protect the justified expectations of parties by the 
application of rules which will bring about uniform results 
whenever and wherever a dispute arises. This can only be 
accomplished in situations such as the present case by 
applying the law of the place of payment when the suit 
is between the alleged holder in due course and the maker 
of the instrument. See Buschmann, Some Conflict of 
Law's Problems Pertaining to Bills a;nd Notes, 8 Ind. L. J. 
213, 227 and 228 ( 1933). 
''. . . In the interest of uniformity in the 
application of law, it is desirable, of course, to have 
the law of the place of payment of the primary 
party govern. This could be accomplished on the 
theory that such. party expects to be governed, 
as to defenses and negotiability, by the law of the 
place of payment, and he is presumed to know what 
constitutes a holder in due course under that 
law .... " 
The validity of this argument can be illustrated by 
the following hypothetical case : 
A writes two checks and delivers them in Utah to B. 
B indorses and deposits one in C bank in state D. He 
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indorses and deposits the other in E bank in State F. 
By the law of State D, the bank has become a holder in 
due course, by the law of State F it has not. Both banks 
bring an action in Utah against A. 
If the Utah court should apply the rule relied on by 
the plaintiff, it would be faced with anomalous situation of 
allowing recovery to Bank C and denying it to Bank E. 
Yet, both cases ;;trose from the same transaction, and 
present identical factual situations. 
It would appear under the prevailing rules of con-
flict of law and logic that the laws of the State of Utah 
must be applied in determining the rights of a holder 
against the drawer of the instrument when the instrument 
was prepared, executed and payable in the State of Utah. 
PoiNT III. 
III. THE CHECK WAS NOT PROTESTED AS 
REQUIRED BY TITLE 44, CHAPTER 2, SECTION 27, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND THERE-
FORE THE DRAWER IS DISCHARGED. 
Title 44, Chapter 2, Section 27, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), states as follows: 
'' 44-2-27. IN wHAT CASES PROTEST NECESSARY. 
-Where a foreign bill appearing on its face to be 
such is dishonored by nonacceptance, it must be 
duly protested for nonacceptance, and where such 
a bill which has not previously been dishonored by 
nonacceptance is dishonored by nonpayment, it 
must be duly protested for nonpayment. If it is 
not so protested, the drawer and indorsers are dis-
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charged. Where a bill does not appear on its face 
to be a foreign bill, protest thereof in case of dis-
honor is unnecessary.'' 
The negotiable instrument, a copy of which is admit-
ted to evidence in this case, and the stipulation of facts 
indicate that the instrument was returned to The Moffat 
County State Bank with the notation "refer to maker." 
The check itself (R-3) contains the notation "not good 
when presented. Not good now 10/24/56. '' It has been 
stipulated that the plaintiff actually countermanded pay-
ment, but this fact was not known to the plaintiff bank 
and the stop payment was not filed with the drawee bank 
until after return of the instrument to plaintiff and 
respondent (R-6) and therefore it was under the duty to 
protest the instrument. 
A formal countermand of the order of payment was 
not executed until after the check was returned marked 
"refer to maker." (R-6) 
The law applicable in this case is set forth in 8 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence Bills and Notes Paragraph 697 
as follows: 
"8 Am. Jur. Bills and Notes, Par. 697 ... The 
Uniform Act provides that where any negotiable 
instrument has been dishonored it may be pro-
tested for non-acceptance or non-payment as the 
case may be, but protest is not required except in 
the case of foreign bills of exchange. The Act fur-
ther provides that where a foreign bill appearing 
on its face to be such is dishonored by non-accept-
ance, it must be duly protested for non-acceptance, 
and where such a bill has not previously been dis-
honored by non-acceptance is dishonored by non-
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payment, it must be duly protested for non-pay-
ment. If it is not so protested, the drawer and 
, endorsers are discharged ... it would seem, how~ 
ever, that a check which is not drawn and payable 
within a State would be regarded as a foreign bill 
of exchange within the meaning of the Uniform 
Act and would require· protest.'' 
The plaintiff and respondent, The Moffat County 
State Bank, is in effect placed on the horns of a dilemma 
for if it contends that the check is an inland bill then no 
question of conflict of laws arise and the law of the State 
of Utah would apply and the said bank would not obtain 
the benefit of being a holder in due course. On the other 
hand if the plaintiff contends that the instrument is a 
foreign bill then it has failed to protest the bill as required 
by the above cited statute and again the drawer of the 
instrument is discharged. The dilemma is in fact solved 
for by a proper application of the rules of conflict of law, 
the laws of the State of Utah must be applied and in all 
events the drawer of th~ instrument is discharged. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff and respondent must qualify as a holder 
in due course in order to obtain judgment against the de-
fendant and appellant. Under the law of the State of 
Utah the plaintiff and respondent has not so qualified. 
The law of the State of Utah is in accord with the major~ 
ity view in the United States. 
The Moffat County State Bank claims that the law of 
the State of Colorado applies and relies almost exchi;. 
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sjvely on the case of Broomfield v. Cochran, supra, but 
such case is not applicable under accepted conflicts of law 
theories for the instrument in question was drawn and 
payable in the State of Utah. 
The plaintiff and respondent can take little comfort 
from the Broomfield case since it is distinguished 
by the in~roduction into evidence in the case at hand 
of the depositor's agreement. This agreement was 
executed by Mr. Arnn at the time of opening the account 
and accepted by the bank by the acceptance of the account 
and specifically and formally designated The Moffat 
County State Bank as agent of the depositor for the pur-
pose of collecting items referred to it. Under the equal 
dignities rule any change in this agreement would have 
to be subscribed by the parties and in writing. No evi-
dence, oral or otherwise of a change in the agreement 
has been adduced. 
The intention of the parties at the time the check was 
delivered by the payee to the receiving bank controls and 
this intention is set forth in two written instruments. 
The plaintiff's proper recourse is against the depositor 
for monies paid. 
Since it is apparent that The Moffat County State 
Bank does not qualify as a holder in due course under the 
law of the State of Utah or the terms of its written agree-
ments and even if it did qualify it has not protested the 
instrument as required by law, it is submitted that the 
defendant and appellant is discharged from obligation on 
the instrument ana the order granting plaintiff's motion 
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for summary judgment was in error and should be set 
aside and judgment entered for the defendant "no cause 
of action.' ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
IRVING H. BIELE 
Attorn.ey for Defendant 
and .Appellant 
Receipt of copies of the above and foregoing Brief 
of the Defendant and Appellant acknowledged this 
----------------day of February, 1960. 
VICTOR A. SPENCER 
.Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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